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Pathways Toward Peace:  
Negotiating National Unity and Ethnic Diversity through Education in Botswana 
 
Abstract 
This study examines how education can disrupt threats of conflict, specifically in the presence of 
ethnic diversity. We present a historical analysis of Botswana, using methods of process tracing 
drawing on documents, in-depth interviews, and Afrobarometer survey data. Post-independence 
Botswana engaged in redistribution of educational access across ethnic groups and promotion of 
common civic principles of social harmony. At the same time, it constructed through schools 
ethnically-based national identity, which excluded many minorities. Lack of recognition for 
ethnic minorities remains a persistent challenge, yet it exists in a context of high commitment to 
unity and the nation-state, even among minority groups, which may have allowed recent dissent 
to happen peacefully. The paper defines mechanisms by which educational redistribution and 
recognition can disrupt resource-based and identity-based inequalities that often lead to conflict. 
This model holds promise for conflict avoidance and mitigation in multiethnic states globally. 
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Pathways Toward Peace: 
Negotiating National Unity and Ethnic Diversity through Education in Botswana 
 
Botswana has been celebrated as an example of enduring peace (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012, 404-414), while many postcolonial Sub-Saharan African nations have struggled with 
ongoing armed conflict. Since independence in 1966, it has remained the most peaceful country 
on the African continent, ranking 31 out of 162 countries on the Global Peace Index (Institute for 
Economics and Peace 2015, 8). It has achieved this stability despite one of the most salient 
predictors of conflict: high ethnic diversity with one ethnic group numerically dominant (Alesina 
et al. 2003; Collier 2001; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010). 
How has Botswana charted a pathway toward peace in spite of the existence of ethnic 
diversity? In this article, we build on the work of scholars who argue that it is not the presence of 
ethnic diversity alone that predicts conflict but instead how this diversity is mobilized by 
institutions and policies of the state (Fearon 2003; Habyarimana et al. 2008).  
Many studies document how the state mobilized ethnic diversity toward conflict in, for 
example, Rwanda, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and Yugoslavia (see, for example, King 2014; 
Novelli and Smith 2011; Heyneman 2000). Underexplored are the ways states can prevent and 
mitigate conflict in the presence of ethnic diversity, particularly through education (Davies 2011; 
Bush and Saltarelli 2000).  
Botswana’s “exceptionalism” has been explained by the economic wealth generated 
through diamond revenues. We argue that the ways in which Botswana has negotiated national 
unity and ethnic diversity are equally exceptional. We examine this instructive negotiation 
through analysis of education in Botswana from independence in 1966 to the present. We take 
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this approach, given the conjunction of (1) the propensity for formal, mass education to be a 
central means of constructing and conveying notions of national identity (Smith 1991); and (2) 
the significant association between armed conflict and exclusionary conceptions of national 
identity forwarded in schools (Davies 2011; King 2014). Importantly, Botswana’s early leaders 
regarded the formal education system as “potentially the most important single instrument for 
nation-building” (National Commission on Education (NCE) 1977, 12). 
 In the next section, we explore how Botswana might have followed a pathway toward 
conflict, especially given its ethnic diversity. In the conceptual framework that follows, we 
define how resource-based and identity-based inequalities contribute to conflict and the 
mechanisms by which educational redistribution and recognition might disrupt these inequalities. 
After outlining our historical process-tracing research design, we present analysis of four 
“historical moments,” which define critical periods of negotiation between national unity and 
ethnic diversity. In the final section, we return to a discussion of the conceptual dilemma of 
building national unity in the presence of ethnic diversity and discuss lessons from Botswana for 
other multiethnic education systems as well as for Botswana’s own future. 
 
The Possibility of Conflict in Botswana 
Conflict in Botswana was more probable than peace. At independence, Botswana was 
among the poorest and least educated countries in the world (Gulbrandsen 2012, 255), and it was 
surrounded by countries experiencing armed conflict in the form of civil wars – in Angola, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe – and ongoing racial strife – in South Africa and Namibia. Further, 
Botswana exemplified many of the same predictors of conflict: an economy based on natural 
resources (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Collier and Hoeffler 2004); low levels of education 
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(Shields and Paulson 2014); and high ethnic diversity with one ethnic group numerically 
dominant (Alesina et al. 2003; Collier 2001; Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).  
The infusion of democratic principles into post-independence institutions led to vesting 
the wealth of diamonds in the state in lieu of in tribes or corporations (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012; Gulbrandsen 2012), countering the first predictor of conflict. For example, education 
spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been consistently close to 10 
percent in Botswana over the past two decades, among the highest in the world (World Bank 
2015). This redistribution of diamond wealth acted on the second predictor of conflict: low levels 
of education. Botswana’s leaders have invested heavily in public education since 1966, at which 
time just 20 percent of children were enrolled in primary school; only 8 percent made the 
transition to secondary school; among all its citizens, Botswana counted just 100 secondary 
school graduates (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012); and there were no universities in the country 
(Meyer, Nagel, and Snyder 1993, 456). Thirty years later, in 1996, 96 percent of school-age 
children were enrolled in school. This expansion in access to education mirrors later trends 
across the world, yet Botswana had achieved near universal primary education by the time of the 
Education for All meetings in Dakar in 1990. Almost fifty years after independence, a child born 
in Botswana could expect 12.4 years of education, the highest in sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO 
2011). 
Governance-focused explanations of Botswana’s stability have over-looked the third 
predictor of conflict: the presence of ethnic diversity. Many scholars have argued that “Botswana 
has one of the most ethnically homogeneous populations in Africa” (Alesina et al. 2003, 181). 
Given that high ethnic diversity is associated with conflict, this homogeneous characterization of 
the country helps to explain the lack of conflict. Yet, this generalization misrepresents ethnic 
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realities in Botswana (Boikhutso and Jotia 2013; Nyati-Ramahobo 2006; Werbner 2002; Fearon 
2003). In fact, Botswana is ethnically heterogeneous, with a pattern of diversity that is most 
predictive of conflict: one dominant ethnic group with many minority groups.  
Although the name of the country indicates that Botswana is the home of the Batswana 
people, many ethnic groups reside within its borders. The Constitution of Botswana recognizes 
eight “major tribes” who are sometimes considered separate ethnic groups but share the common 
language, Setswana (Nyati-Ramahobo 2006; Pansiri 2012; Republic of Botswana 2000). These 
groups, living mainly in the south and east of Botswana, are the Bangwato, Bangwaketse, 
Bakgatla, Balete, Batlokwa, Batawana, Barolong, and Bakwena. In this paper, as is customary in 
English, we refer to these ethnic groups as Tswana and to their language as Setswana, reserving 
the term ‘Batswana’ to connote citizens of Botswana, regardless of ethnic origin. Tswana are the 
numerically dominant ethnic group in Botswana, yet estimates vary widely – from 80 percent of 
the population in some government policies to 18 percent in reports by minority rights advocates 
(Nyati-Saleshando 2011; NCE 1977). 
Indigenous to Botswana are also many non-Setswana-speaking ethnic groups who live 
throughout the country but are concentrated in the west and north (Pansiri 2012; Nyati-
Ramahobo 2006). The largest of these groups include the Basarwa, Bakgalagadi, Bakalanga, 
Wayeyi, Ovaherero, Basubiya, and Ovambukushu. With the exception of the Basarwa (known 
internationally as the Khoisan), each of these groups speaks a single language that is mutually 
unintelligible with Setswana but in the same Bantu language family. The colonial-era census of 
1946 was the last to ask residents to indicate their ethnic background (Nyati-Ramahobo 2006). 
The only nationally representative data that includes self-reported measures of ethnic group in 
Botswana is the Afrobarometer. In the three years in which data on ethnicity is available (2005, 
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2008, and 2012), slightly more than half of respondents identify as Tswana and just under half 
identify as one of 21 other ethnic groups.  
Ethnic minorities have been geographically, politically, and economically marginalized. 
Hierarchical in nature, pre-colonial Tswana kingdoms placed ethnic minorities in positions of 
serfdom (Gulbrandsen 2012). Post-colonial development in agriculture, the central livelihood for 
Batswana, was concentrated in Tswana-dominated regions (Leith 2005). Further, only Tswana 
groups have Constitutionally-granted political representation in the House of Chiefs (Republic of 
Botswana 1966). These marginalizations are explored in more detail in our analysis. While a 
pure majority/minority dichotomy is a false one, the eight Tswana groups constitute what are 
usually described as the ‘majority’, while the unacknowledged but self-identifying non-Tswana 
ethnic groups make up the ‘minority.’  
Peace and stability are not fixed characteristics of Botswana and, in fact, appear to be 
improbable outcomes. In what ways did the state act through educational institutions and policies 
to disrupt potential conflict? We explore conceptual mechanisms below before turning to 
empirical evidence.  
 
Disrupting Resource-based and Identity-based Inequalities 
Education can mobilize ethnic diversity toward conflict when, in its structures and/or 
content, it creates or exacerbates inequalities. Such is particularly true when such inequalities 
exist between groups. Inequalities that exist among individuals, “vertical inequalities,” are not 
associated with intergroup conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
However, inequalities between groups, “horizontal inequalities,” are associated with intergroup 
conflict (Østby 2008; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Ethnic inequalities in 
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particular predict conflict; perceived inequalities, even in the absence of verifiable evidence, can 
be just as pernicious (Brown and Langer 2010).  
Evidence for the ways in which education can lead to conflict may be summarized as 
falling into two main categories: resource-based inequalities and identity-based inequalities. 
Countries that experience conflict often exhibit significant inequalities in the allocation of 
educational resources among ethnic groups. In 2001 in Nepal, for example, the literacy rate 
among the ruling Brahmins was 70 percent compared with only 10 percent among the 
lower/excluded castes (Novelli and Smith 2011). Similarly in pre-genocide Rwanda, promotion 
past primary school was tied to ethnic group, with secondary school entrance allocated according 
to ethnic quotas such that Tutsi were required to have higher scores than Hutu (King 2014, 89).  
Identity-based inequalities create “us vs. them” oppositions and stigmatization (see King 
2014, 19). These inequalities can manifest in curriculum, through symbols, values, and 
particularly through historical narratives. For example, a 1994 Bosnian civics textbook for junior 
secondary school condemned the “[h]orrible crimes committed against the non-Serb population 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serb-Montenegrin aggressors” (Heyneman 2000). As Heyneman 
argues, whether or not these events occurred needs to be kept separate from the distance such a 
narrative can create between students (2000, 182) and the contributions such narratives can make 
to identity-based inequalities linked to conflict. In particular, individuals who experience 
identity-based inequalities, such as through negative characterization or marginalization in 
curricula, often have weak identification with their nation-states (Osler and Vincent 2002, 114-
127; Banks 2008, 133), which could lead to less stake in the protection and promotion of peace 
and stability. 
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If resource-based and identity-based inequalities can link education to conflict, how 
might redistribution of resources and recognition of identities disrupt inequalities and link 
education to peace? Fraser (2010) draws out the salience of distribution and recognition in her 
work focused on gender, with important implications for ethnicity. In order to avoid inequalities 
and to foster what she calls “parity of participation,” resources must be distributed so as to 
mitigate disparities that prevent full participation. In most cases, this requires the redistribution 
of resources in order to rectify existing inequalities. The massive expansion of access to 
education in post-genocide Rwanda, for example, represented a redistribution aimed at 
redressing past inequalities. Equitable distribution of resources could also be preemptive, 
intended to prevent conflict.  
Marshall (2009 [1950]) argued that the distribution of resources is in fact a critical 
dimension of citizenship. Social citizenship is the promise of access to social services, including 
education, that allow for full participation in society. Yet as Banks (2008) noted, following 
Lipset, Marshall’s typology is based on an “assumption of equality.” Banks argued for expansion 
of the conception to include cultural citizenship that addresses exclusion of ethnic and linguistic 
minorities (2008, 130). The implication is that identity-based inequalities can be countered 
through recognition. Recognition involves all people having equal respect and status and the 
ability to participate fully in society (Gutmann 2003).  
Education can foster recognition through curriculum, such as through multicultural 
education, which aims to ensure, for example, that the contributions of diverse groups are 
integrated into the history curriculum (Freedman et al. 2008; Paulson 2015) and embodies 
“respect for individuals and their equal rights as citizens” (Gutmann 2004, 80). It is not only the 
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intent of curricular recognition but its outcomes that are critical: recognition is only realized 
when diverse children have equal chance at school success (Banks and McGee Banks 2001).  
Political theorists continue to debate the extent to which this recognition strengthens 
societies by enabling full participation by all against the potential costs vis-à-vis “weakening 
citizens’ ability to communicate, trust, and feel solidarity across group differences” (Kymlicka 
and Norman 2000, 10). Education is frequently the frontline in managing this tension, called 
upon to counter “us vs. them” conceptualizations and to promote shared understandings and 
common goals. The mechanisms can be both curricular and relational. Curriculum that focuses 
on skills, beliefs, and attitudes that encourage openness to multiple perspectives and empathy 
toward other groups can build relationships and experiences that reflect what Kymlicka and 
Norman called “a new transcendent identity” (2000, 14). In divided societies, Bar-Tal and Rosen 
(2009) emphasized the importance of reflective thinking, tolerance, empathy, human rights, and 
conflict resolution in reducing conflict among groups. Research in social psychology illuminates 
the ways in which unity in diversity might occur through exposure to this type of education. 
When individuals come to see themselves as mutually interdependent, they can begin to “feel a 
sense of ‘we-ness’” (Turner et al. 1987, 34). The resulting common group identity can mitigate 
the liabilities associated with heterogeneity (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). The persistent question 
is the extent to which this type of common group identity can enable recognition and disrupt 
identity-based inequalities. 
Through the lens of resource-based and identity-based inequalities, and their corollaries 
of redistribution and recognition, we examine the ways in which Botswana has negotiated 
national unity and ethnic diversity in education and how these experiences have informed its 
pathway to peace.  
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Methods 
We used process tracing to draw inferences about past events and to develop an 
understanding of processes and the causes of particular outcomes (Bennett 2010; Collier 2011). 
We sought both to explain and to build theory around processes of negotiating national unity 
through education in the face of ethnic diversity and the threat of conflict. Our analysis involved 
three types of evidence: documents, interviews, and data from the nationally-representative 
Afrobarometer survey.  
In order to understand the negotiation of national unity and ethnic diversity in Botswana, 
we selected and analyzed key documents. Six documents comprise Botswana’s post-
independence policy frameworks in education and in issues related to ethnic diversity, and we 
conducted a close textual analysis of all of them: (1) the 1977 report of the National Commission 
on Education, called Education for Kagisano, which was the first post-independence policy, 
many years in development; (2) the 1994 Revised National Policy on Education (RNPE); (3) the 
report of the National Commission on Education (1993) on which the RNPE was based; (4) the 
vision statement that guides all planning and policy in the country, Vision 2016; (5) the 2000 
report of a Government commission investigating the presence of discrimination in the 
Constitution, the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Sections 77, 78, and 79 of the 
Constitution of Botswana; and (6) the 2001 National Policy on Culture. We also decided to 
analyze the most recent national planning document, National Development Plan 10 (2009-2016) 
and its mid-term review for insight into more recent thinking, given the dearth of new education 
policies. 
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School syllabi were a second set of documents that we analyzed. We read and coded each 
objective in all of the post-independence Junior Secondary School (JSS) Social Studies Syllabi 
(1994, 1996, and 2010) to identify portions of the curriculum related to our research questions. 
These objectives represent “authorized knowledge” as approved by the Ministry of Education, 
and they guide the organization and content of textbooks and national exams. Social studies is 
charged with teaching students “the national principles and the ideals upon which the nation of 
Botswana is built” (Republic of Botswana 2010, i). JSS marks the final three years of 
Botswana’s free ten-year basic education program and the end-point of formal education for 
most Batswana. Educational research in other historical periods and our own contemporary 
research reveal that teachers exhibit high fidelity to the written curriculum (Fuller and Snyder 
1991), such that Tafa labeled them ‘technicians’ (2004, 757).  
Interviews with key informants complemented our analysis of policy documents and 
syllabi. We conducted these in-depth interviews (n=13) between July 2013 and August 2014. In 
process tracing, interviews are designed to corroborate and elaborate on documentary historical 
evidence, so we chose interview participants who held knowledge that could not be gleaned from 
documentary sources alone and who occupied a range of positions, both internal and external to 
policy development and implementation processes. We identified key actors from our document 
analysis, guidance from colleagues at the University of Botswana, and through a snowball 
approach. We conducted interviews until we reached saturation, in other words we began to hear 
similar perspectives on the issues under study; we further tested the emergence of themes in 
ongoing analysis and, when we ceased to find new ideas and explanations, we developed 
confidence that our data represented the existing range of patterns to sufficiently answer the 
research question (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006). Our final interview sample included 
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Ministry of Education staff (political appointees and civil servants), leaders of human rights and 
language advocacy groups, academics, a textbook writer, and a member of the Vision 2016 
Commission (see Table 1). 
We asked interview participants to describe their views on, for example, policy-making 
processes; how and to what extent policies were implemented; the principles that guide national 
unity; and the relationships between inequalities and ethnic diversity. We developed 
individualized interview guides for each interview participant based on position and experiences, 
for example, asking the textbook writer about how the syllabi guided decisions on textbook 
content. There were also common questions across interview guides including but not limited to: 
What do children learn about national unity in school?; Tell me about Education for Kagisano 
and the RNPE: what national goals did they express?; What do you think, is there a shift away 
from monoculturalism in schools now? Tell me what you see taking place. After each interview, 
we listened to the recording and wrote in-depth notes on all of the content, including some 
verbatim quotes, and wrote analytic memos on emerging themes. 
To trace the changing discourse between 1977 and 2014 around national unity, we 
identified excerpts from the documents that a) defined or operationalized national principles or 
goals, b) discussed ethnic, linguistic, or regional diversity, c) contextualized the reasoning behind 
or process of creating the policy, d) discussed elements that comprise national identity, or e) 
described how the education system would help build national unity. Through initial analyses, 
we identified code families, related to access, equity, quality, participation, national principles, 
and identity. We coded the document excerpts at the line level, identifying patterns within and 
across data sources. We analyzed patterns in the relative importance of different components of 
national identity over time. We analyzed the interview notes using the same coding structure, but 
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with a specific focus on explanations for the changing patterns observed in the document 
analysis.  
We also analyzed data from the nationally-representative Afrobarometer survey, a large 
public opinion dataset. Data is collected using national probability samples for all citizens of 
voting age. The sample is a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample, which 
seeks to reduce the likelihood that ethnic groups are excluded from the sample. The sample size 
of 1200 in Botswana allows inferences to the national adult population with a margin of error of 
+/- 2.8 percent with a confidence level of 95 percent. In each year of the survey, there were 1200 
respondents, for a total of 6000 respondents over five administrations of the survey (19991, 2003, 
2005, 2008, and 2012); we used data from all five years. The data is self-weighting, aside from 
2008 and 2012, which we weighted appropriately using the weights provided by Afrobarometer. 
We created a variable for ethnicity to group respondents who (a) identify themselves as 
belonging to one of the eight “major” tribes in Botswana, who are recognized in the Constitution 
and include Setswana speakers, or (b) identify themselves as belonging to another ethnic group.2 
The former we conceptualize as ‘majority’ ethnic groups, the latter as ‘minority’ ethnic groups.3  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Building National Unity within Ethnic Diversity: Botswana’s Approach 
Below, we trace the evolving nature of Botswana’s approach to the dilemma of 
constructing national unity in the presence of ethnic diversity through four “moments.” The first 
moment analyzes the development of Education for Kagisano (1977), Botswana’s first post-
independence education policy document, which embraced the majority indigenous language, 
Setswana, and promoted elements of Tswana culture as the basis of the national identity of all 
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citizens, including members of ethnic minority groups. The second moment explores the 
development of the Revised National Policy on Education (1994). The RNPE shifted away from 
the promotion of Tswana culture, but rejected the recommendation of its precursor National 
Commission on Education (1993) to introduce minority language instruction in schools and 
instead emphasized the need for all citizens to learn Setswana. The third moment analyzes 
Vision 2016, drafted in 1997 to articulate national goals for the 50th anniversary of 
independence. Vision 2016 departed from the conception of Tswana-based national identity, 
calling for recognition of ethnic diversity and minority language instruction in schools. The final 
moment examines the Balopi Commission, which investigated discrimination in the Botswana 
Constitution, and its aftermath, a time period of direct challenge to Government policies, the 
formation of language advocacy groups, and continued agitation for the teaching of minority 
languages in schools. Figure 1 illustrates these moments. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Moment 1: The Building of National Unity 
For the first decade of independence, there was no new education policy in Botswana and 
colonial British policies remained in use (Interview #8). In 1975, the National Commission on 
Education (NCE) was established to review the education system in Botswana. The Commission 
found that “education generally has failed to satisfy the hopes of Batswana” (NCE 1977, 1). Its 
report formed the basis of Education for Kagisano, the first post-independence education policy 
document, published in 1977, which aimed to create an education system that would fulfill those 
hopes.  
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A current leader in the Ministry of Education described this policy as “education for 
nation-building” (Interview #10). Our analysis reveals two main guiding purposes for education 
in Botswana: first, bringing all Batswana into the economy; and second, the building of national 
unity through kagisano, or social harmony. The economic and social aspects of nation-building 
both have implications for unity and ethnic diversity. Education for Kagisano envisions “national 
unity” as a) equitable access to educational resources across regions and socioeconomic groups, 
which could be characterized as redistribution, combatting resource-based inequalities; and b) a 
homogeneous national culture based on the national principles and the language and culture of 
the majority Tswana ethnic group, a lack of recognition that leaves open possibilities for 
identity-based inequalities. 
The first purpose of education was for economic development. Economic development 
could be best fostered, the Commission argued, through the equitable distribution of educational 
opportunities – to rectify the “[h]itherto… stratified and hierarchical” education system (NCE 
1977, 212). Instead of focusing on secondary and tertiary education, which it labeled “socially 
divisive,” it advocated the expansion of primary education to avoid “a society which is polarised 
between rich and poor, urban and rural, well-educated and semi-literate, a privileged minority 
and an underprivileged majority” (NCE 1977, 210).  
The second purpose of education in Education for Kagisano was related to social 
harmony. This purpose was not unconnected to the equitable provision of educational 
opportunities and, again, centered on redistribution. The Commission wrote that “[i]t will not be 
possible to speak of the achievement of unity and social justice in Botswana while many children 
are deprived of access to school” (NCE 1977, 58). Equity between ethnic and language groups 
arose only twice in this document (NCE 1977, 12, 32). The Commission warned against bias in 
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national exams that might exclude children in rural areas, from poor families, and from “certain 
language groups” and cautioned that “[i]n any consideration of language policy, the rights and 
needs of the linguistic minority groups must be considered carefully, together with educational 
and national unity factors” (NCE 1977, 32). There were no specific policy recommendations for 
addressing these needs. 
The Commission defined not only equitable access to individual development as central 
to social harmony, but also certain content of education necessary to foster this harmony. 
Education for Kagisano described the four national principles that schools should promote: 
democracy, development, self-reliance, and unity (NCE 1977, 24). These principles were seen as 
central to a liberal-democratic nation-building agenda (see Carnoy, Chisholm, and Chilisa 2012, 
17). They were not specific to one ethnic or language group, were put forth in the context of 
equity. 
Our analysis, however, reveals an explicit sub-text of nation-building premised on 
monolingualism and monoculturalism (see also, Nyati-Ramahobo 2006; Tabulawa 2009; 2011, 
and for analysis of these issues outside of education, see Werbner, 2002). Tswana culture and the 
Setswana language were privileged: “Tswana language and culture must be part of the 
intellectual development of every child in Botswana” (NCE 1977, 110). The Commission noted 
that “[i]t is of paramount importance to the national consciousness that every citizen of the 
country should be fully proficient in Setswana” (NCE 1993, 111) and that “Setswana is a vital 
medium of communication in the country and is the vehicle through which the national culture is 
largely expressed” (NCE 1977, 177). 
The policy further defined national culture as Tswana culture and established that all 
students complete “Tswana language and culture” as one of six curricular areas required 
Pathways Toward Peace 
 16 
throughout primary and secondary school, “as a source of both the ability to communicate in the 
national language and a sense of national unity” (NCE 1977, 108, 110, 113). The adopted 
language policy named Setswana as the language of instruction for the first four years of school 
and English thereafter.  
Education for Kagisano was the educational manifestation of what Werbner called the 
“One-Nation Consensus.” This idea, established at independence, held that building one state 
required building one nation. It was “assimilationist, favouring homogeneity, fostered through 
one official and one recognised language, respectively English and Tswana” (Werbner 2002, 
676). While this consensus was broad, it was by no means universal.  
 The need to build a strong, unified state is importantly contextualized in the regional 
realities of the time. The major priority, said a Ministry of Education staff member, was to be 
different from other countries that were engulfed in conflict (Interview #8). The Commission 
wrote that “Botswana’s education system has an important responsibility to express clearly the 
country’s national principles and the spirit of a free, non-racial society at a time when 
neighboring countries are subject to internal turmoil and racial strife” (NCE 1977, 18).  
The decision to emphasize economic development and social harmony through the 
synthesis of the four principles of democracy, development, self-reliance, and unity with a 
Tswana-based national identity was presented as necessary, the only pathway away from 
divisiveness within the state. The resulting “one nation” vision in education – as Gulbrandsen 
(2012) argues existed in society broadly – was intended as a method of avoiding conflict, even if 
that conflict was not outwardly manifest at the time. The cost was that the adopted model of 
unity did not include recognition of ethnic diversity and left open possibilities of identity-based 
inequalities. 
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Moment 2: The Salience of Ethnicity and Language 
In April 1992, the second National Commission on Education was mandated to review 
“the entire education system with a view to developing a system that would see the country into 
the twenty-first century” (NCE 1993, i). With continued economic growth and the ability to 
attract both foreign aid and foreign investment, expansion of education had been rapid in the 
intervening time: by 1985, there were 558 primary schools, more than double the number at 
independence, and 68 secondary schools, up from nine. Education received the largest proportion 
of the recurrent budget, 22 percent (Republic of Botswana 1994, 12).  
In 1994, the findings and recommendations of the NCE were published as the Revised 
National Policy on Education (RNPE). Despite being authored in 1994, interview participants 
noted that “[t]he RNPE is the main document guiding education policy in the country” at present 
(Interview #4, also #8, #12). The main focus of the RNPE was economic development, with less 
attention paid to the social dimensions of education and nation-building. The policy noted that 
“[t]he education and training strategy as enunciated in the Commission’s report will aim at 
ensuring that the people of Botswana, as a major national resource, will have invested in them 
an education necessary for national development” (Republic of Botswana 1994, Section 3.1). 
Unlike in Education for Kagisano, where ‘national development’ referred to both social and 
economic development, the RNPE stressed the latter. At the same time, the RNPE was more 
attentive to ethnic dimensions of equity and defined a specific language policy. Changes between 
Social Studies syllabi that came immediately before and after the RNPE also signified a shift in 
thinking about the recognition of non-Tswana ethnic groups. 
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The RNPE emphasized redistribution: expanding access to the most marginalized 
children and young people who had to date been left out of mass educational expansion. 
Tabulawa (2009, 90-91) argued that this shift represented Botswana’s “response to 
globalization” in that it aimed to prepare students to work in the post-Fordist global economy, 
citing the 1993 report of the National Commission on Education, which stated that “[t]he 
education system was extolled to ‘offer individuals a lifelong opportunity to develop themselves 
and to make their country competitive internationally’ (Republic of Botswana 1993, 4).” 
At the same time, the RNPE newly identified ethnicity as one dimension on which 
students had been disadvantaged. Areas cited for lower enrollment rates – 65 percent compared 
to 95 percent – and shortages of trained teachers – 42 percent compared to 5 percent – were 
regions highly populated with non-Tswana ethnic groups and non-Setswana speakers. The 
distribution of educational resources for national development reflected horizontal inequalities, 
on the basis of ethnicity and language. Though these inequalities were explicitly reflected in the 
RNPE, related political conflict was only beginning to surface, and there were no instances of 
violence.  
The RNPE also addressed recognition, citing the need to “improve the response of 
schools to the needs of different ethnic groups in the society” and “sensitizing teachers to 
cultural differences” (Republic of Botswana 1994, Section 3.2.e). Central to responding to the 
needs of ethnic minority students was mother-tongue instruction. The Commission 
acknowledged “the importance of Setswana as a national language and a unifying force” but 
concluded that “the present language policy denies the child mastery of the main language tool 
[local language] needed for better achievement in primary school and in further education and in 
working life” (NCE 1993, 113). It recommended that children be taught initially “the language 
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dominant in the area where the school is located,” with English and Setswana gradually 
introduced thereafter (Republic of Botswana 1994, Recommendation 12). While this 
recommendation created an opportunity for recognition, Parliament did not accept the 
recommendation, noting a lack of resources and being “contrary to national language policy” 
(Republic of Botswana 1994, 84-85). This decision to continue promoting monolingual national 
unity contributed to lack of recognition and the beginnings of organized dissent among minority 
groups (Nyati-Ramahobo 2006, 208-209). 
One area of significant change was that, unlike Education for Kagisano, the RNPE never 
mentioned instruction in “Tswana culture.” We see further evidence of a shift from Tswana-
dominated curricular content in syllabi. In 1994, the first overall aim was to “show knowledge 
and understanding of Tswana culture, language, literature, arts, crafts and traditions” (Republic 
of Botswana 1994, 1). By 1996, this aim had disappeared completely and most of the 15 aims 
related to employment readiness. The framing of cultural knowledge in the relevant aim in 1996 
was oriented away from monoculturalism and toward recognition of many cultures, expecting 
that learners will have: “acquired knowledge and understanding of society, appreciation of their 
culture including languages, traditions, songs, ceremonies, customs, social norms and a sense of 
citizenship” (Republic of Botswana 1996, ii).   
This shift away from Tswana culture in the 1994 RNPE and resulting syllabus reflected 
local political and social realities. The RNPE was released eight months before a national 
election, as much a political manifesto and policy of appeasement – related to economic 
competiveness, and youth unemployment in particular – for the incumbent party as it was an 
education policy (Tabulawa 2011). Further, Zimbabwe and Namibia were relatively peaceful at 
this time, and South Africa was embedding cultural and linguistic rights in its new Constitution. 
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A Ministry of Education staff member reflected that the era of the RNPE was one with less fear 
of armed and violent conflict than the era of Education for Kagisano (Interview #8), and yet this 
era surfaced identity-based inequalities and heralded a transition from unchallenged assimilatory 
policies toward more nuanced conceptions of unity.   
 
Moment 3: Unity in Diversity 
The process of developing Vision 2016, initiated in the mid-1990s, continued the spirit of 
the RNPE. It was, as a member of the Vision 2016 Task Group said, “like a referendum with one 
question” (Interview #7), that question being “What kind of society would we like Botswana to 
be by the year 2016 [the fiftieth anniversary of independence]?” (Presidential Task Group (PTG), 
1997, 1). Based on extensive consultations, “[t]he national Vision was conceptualised to be a 
product reflecting broad consensus of the Botswana population,” the Task Group wrote (1997, 
79). “It belonged to the nation,” said a member of the Vision 2016 Task Group (Interview #7). 
From the Vision 2016 consultations, education was “clearly the number one pillar” 
(Interview #7), and the First Pillar of the finalized Vision 2016 was “An Educated, Informed 
Nation” (PTG, 1997, 5). The implementation section of the Vision noted that “[t]he new policy 
on education [the RNPE] is an important step in the realization of the Vision, and it will need to 
be vigorously implemented and developed” (PTG, 1997, 28). Echoing the RNPE, Vision 2016 
contained a clear emphasis on the role of education for economic development. The social 
purposes of education were also clear, particularly related to recognition of ethnicity.  
Importantly, Botswana had rectified some of the horizontal inequalities identified in the 
previous Moment. For example, in 1975-1976, 69 percent of the variance in mathematics 
achievement was due to school factors, particularly resource inputs; by 1989, only 12 percent of 
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the variance was between schools (Marope 1996). Yet within school variance remained high. 
While framed in policy dialogue as a vertical inequality rather than a horizontal one, some 
students were not doing as well as others. Peaceful pressure from ethnic minority groups began 
to grow at this time, and while Vision 2016 lacked the implementation powers of a policy, it 
catalyzed an important shift to focus on issues of recognition in education.   
Vision 2016 stated that “Botswana contains a diversity of tribes with different languages 
that are not equally recognised, and there are signs of disunity and separateness.” Central to the 
purpose of the Vision was “to meet the challenge of building a united nation that harnesses this 
diversity” (PTG, 1997, 26). The conceptualization of unity in Vision 2016 diverged from 
previous Moments in three key respects: first related to equity and a shift from redistribution to 
redistribution plus recognition; second related to the elements of commonality; and third related 
to understanding of the cultural composition of the country. The points of commonality in Vision 
2016 consisted not of a homogeneous language and culture but of “common goals,” “a common 
heritage,” and “a common destiny.” In direct contrast to Education for Kagisano’s vision of 
national unity built around Setswana language and Tswana culture, Vision 2016 highlighted the 
continuing presence of “a diverse mix of cultures, languages, traditions, and peoples.” The terms 
“ethnic integration,” “full partnership,” and “nation in harmony” connoted a unity that arose 
from a shared tolerance for ethnic diversity rather than assimilation to a single, dominant ethnic 
culture. 
Vision 2016’s final education goal also reflected this shift by attending to linguistic 
diversity. It stated that “Botswana’s wealth of different languages and cultural traditions will be 
recognised, supported and strengthened within the education system” (PTG, 1997, 5) such that 
“all of the nation’s languages must be taught to a high standard at primary, secondary and 
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tertiary level” (PTG, 1997, 26). Unlike the education goals that pertained to economic 
development, however, this goal for addressing linguistic diversity in schools was not 
implemented, showing continued lack of movement on this issue.  
Vision 2016 reflected the rising public salience of marginalization of ethnic minorities in 
Botswana. It was a time of advocacy, particularly in the area of language rights, and of formation 
of language and cultural groups among the Kalanga (1986), Wayeyi (1995), and Batswapong 
(1998) (Nyati-Ramahobo 2006; Nyati-Saleshando 2011, 573), as well as of Tswana opposition to 
these groups, particularly by the nationalist group Pitso Ya Batswana (Gulbrandsen 2012). This 
dissent was, in all instances, peaceful. The political response was mixed. President Masire 
publically warned of the dangers of “letting the tiger loose” (Werbner 2002), meaning ethnic 
tensions. Subsequently, President Mogae advocated for the activities of cultural organizations, 
but on the condition that they promote national unity rather than divisiveness.  
In this context, Vision 2016 seemed to be the realization of a new understanding of 
national unity, one based not on Tswana culture and language but on ethnic and linguistic 
diversity (Interviews #1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13). Despite lacking implementation power, a social 
studies textbook author described Vision 2016 as a major shift for the everyday life of citizens of 
Botswana: it ushered in an era in which “[b]eing different [meaning non-Tswana] does not mean 
being inferior…” (Interview #11). Echoed in the 2005 Afrobarometer survey, members of both 
majority ethnic groups and minority ethnic groups perceived that their ethnic groups were never 
treated unfairly by Government, 71 and 61 percent respectively.  
Concrete shifts prompted by Vision 2016 were nevertheless limited because it lacked the 
implementation powers of policy documents. A Ministry of Education leader stated that Vision 
2016 “allows you to dream, but now when you come to put in an actual plan, you have to cut 
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your dream into step by step and what is realistically possible” (Interview #4). On the 
recommendations vis-à-vis languages in schools, he noted, “it will be difficult to attain them.” A 
member of a language rights NGO noted “total resistance” for coming up with an 
implementation-ready language policy (Interview #5). A professor at the University of Botswana 
described what he saw as “subtle pushback,” in blaming the failure to implement the language 
recommendations of Vision 2016 on the lack of resources rather than recognizing the reality he 
saw: the lack of political will (Interview #13). Another professor explained his view that even in 
the aftermath of Vision 2016, “[t]eachers are trained as if we are a monocultural society, a one 
language society” (Interview #6). 
A member of the Vision 2016 Task Group described Vision 2016 as “just a song.” He 
said, “apart from the Bible, this is the most quoted book in the country. But I don’t think the 
behavior reflects the book…. I don’t see it having shaped behavior of leaders.” Despite the 
conversations that Vision 2016 catalyzed, if he were to write a book on the process, he said, it 
would be called “Vision 2016: A Vision Betrayed” (Interview #7). 
 
Moment 4: A Vision “Betrayed” 
Education for Kagisano, the RNPE, and Vision 2016 agreed on the importance of 
establishing a strong sense of national unity to bring all citizens of Botswana together and on the 
essential role of education in so doing. The 1993 NCE and Vision 2016 identified key 
educational mechanisms for meeting the needs of ethnic minorities, specifically using minority 
languages in schools. Vision 2016 also gave cultural and language advocacy groups an opening 
for recognition, to see their views reflected in the national dialogue. However, with the rejection 
of the 1993 NCE recommendation and increasing consensus that the tenets of Vision 2016 were 
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rhetoric alone, the era after Vision 2016 was a time of direct challenge to the Constitution and 
Government policies, specifically those in education that fell short of meeting redistribution and 
recognition needs of ethnic minorities. These formal challenges to resource-based and identity-
based inequalities were unprecedented in post-independence Botswana and represented a shift in 
the ways in which issues of national unity and ethnic diversity were addressed. What remained 
consistent was the lack of violence. 
Importantly, this time was also characterized by strong feelings of unity. In 2003, only 28 
percent of respondents to the Afrobarometer survey described their ethnic identity as the group 
they belong to first and foremost, whereas 95 percent had described themselves that way in 
1999.4 Further, 42 percent of respondents in 2003 said either that they did not differentiate 
themselves in a way other than being a citizen of Botswana or that they had only a national 
identity; in 1999, less than 1 percent had said they did not differentiate and a little over 2 percent 
said only Motswana, equivalent to national identity. In this way, and critical to Botswana’s 
unique pathway toward peace, dissent occurred within a context of unity. 
 Yet with burgeoning advocacy for equal recognition and direct political challenge by a 
Wayeyi group to the Constitutional arrangement whereby only Tswana groups were represented 
in the House of Chiefs, President Mogae established the Balopi Commission to investigate 
discrimination in the Constitution. An observer of the process noted that “the Commission went 
around the country and ‘wow,’ ‘wow,’ wow.’ People spoke and you could hear that people had 
just been boiling. They see the discrimination but they just didn’t know what to do with it…. 
Even some of the Setswana people were saying, ‘we can’t live in a country where we still 
discriminate against other people, it’s not right, it’s not right’” (Interview #1). One primary piece 
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of evidence in documenting discrimination was educational policy that did not recognize 
minority languages (Nyamnjoh 2002, 760).  
The Commission found that citizens still self-identified along ethnic lines and believed 
that preference for Tswana citizens was ingrained in the Constitution itself. The report concluded 
that “if the Constitution was not amended, the long-term stability of this country, and in 
particular, the sustainability of its unity, could not be guaranteed” (Republic of Botswana 2000, 
9). The momentum of the Balopi Commission catalyzed minority groups and enabled coalition-
building around both redistribution of educational resources and recognition in education, 
through language and content. The Commission’s report also presented a clear path for 
mitigating resource-based and, in particular, identity-based inequalities. 
The Government’s response, however, did not adopt this path and fell short of these 
groups’ hopes. A revised White paper, accepted in mid-2002, promised the discriminatory 
sections of the Constitution would be amended at an unspecified date, but maintained the 
privileged position of the eight Tswana chiefs (Nyati-Ramahobo, 2006a; Werbner, 2002). In 
2001, Parliament passed the National Policy on Culture. Like Vision 2016, this new policy 
affirmed ethnic diversity as central to national identity and named the formal education system as 
the key institution for “enculturation” yet did not act on inclusive curricular content or 
instruction in minority languages (Republic of Botswana 2001). Instead, research on and 
development of minority languages and cultures was left to private organizations (Nyati-
Ramahobo 2006, Interviews #1, 5). 
More than ten years after the Balopi Commission and the National Policy on Culture, 
only small changes have been made to the educational approach to national unity based on 
Tswana culture and language. The phrase “unity in diversity” was included in the 2010 Social 
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Studies syllabus, as one of the aims: “learners should have developed tolerance towards different 
cultures, pride in own culture and unity in diversity” (Republic of Botswana 2010). Yet there is 
wide agreement that this shift is superficial (Interviews #1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12). NDP10 does not 
acknowledge ethnicity or language to be the basis of disadvantage or vulnerability within the 
education system (Republic of Botswana 2009, 105). As Fraser (2000) warned, as claims for 
recognition emerge, pressure for redistribution can fade. Further, while the National Policy on 
Culture enables cultural festivals celebrating both majority and minority groups, they are 
perceived as “tokenism,” recognition of diversity that is confined to a few days and for which 
there continues to be little space in schools (Interviews #1, 5, 6). A University of Botswana 
professor reflected, “You are only brought in to come and dance, to dress in your own culture, to 
appear primitive,” he said. Real change would only occur, he stated, if education “promoted your 
language” and “the school system promoted your culture” (Interview #6). 
Vis-à-vis language of instruction in schools, “a decision has not been taken on these 
issues,” said a Ministry of Education leader. The “resource requirements” are not in place, she 
said, and the Ministry of Education has prioritized access (Interview #10). While Parliament has 
continued to debate ethnic and linguistic equity and language advocacy groups work privately to 
develop educational materials in minority languages, the education system maintains English and 
Setswana as the only languages of instruction. 
This period of agitation for recognition exemplifies the interethnic tensions that do exist 
in Botswana. These tensions could have been grounds for violent conflict. In Botswana, 
however, they were not. Amidst the dissent remained an underlying sense of unity, carefully 
inculcated, as we have seen, since independence. By 2012, Afrobarometer data reveal that 64 
percent of Tswana and 68 percent of minority ethnic group members described feeling equally 
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Motswana and their ethnic group, with only 6 percent of each feeling only ethnic. Further, 77 
percent of both Tswana and minority ethnic groups strongly agreed with the statement, “It makes 
you proud to be called a Motswana.”  
 
Conclusion 
In drafting Vision 2016, the question asked of citizens of Botswana was, “What kind of 
society would we like Botswana to be by the year 2016?” Two widespread responses to this 
question were stable and free from discrimination. The most peaceful society in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Botswana has, to date, achieved the former. Has this stability, however, come at the 
expense of freedom from discrimination? And, if so, are there consequences for ongoing 
stability? 
As we demonstrate, post-independence Botswana chose to construct national unity 
through schools, with the intention of disrupting patterns of violent conflict that existed in 
neighboring countries. This unity was initially premised on the dominant Tswana culture and 
Setswana language. At the same time, attention to redistribution was high, and the government 
massively and quickly expanded access to education. This redistribution fostered perceptions that 
members of all ethnic groups could share in national prosperity. Civic principles of social 
harmony further inculcated among citizens of Botswana a sense of pride in being Motswana. 
Despite ethnic differences, with this overarching sense of common belonging and shared 
resources, there was less chance of inequalities being perceived as connected to a particular 
group – at least in perception, they remained vertical inequalities rather than horizontal ones.  
The decision to build national unity around Tswana culture and the Setswana language 
nevertheless also had costs. The aftermath of Vision 2016 and the Balopi Commission 
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demonstrated important concerns about discrimination in Botswana. This more recent period 
highlighted lack of recognition of ethnic minorities, particularly as manifest in school curriculum 
and language of instruction policies. These identity-based inequalities are horizontal inequalities, 
and they are increasingly perceived as such in Botswana.  Are the very policies that were aimed 
at promoting national unity now a threat to the ongoing stability of Botswana?  
Experiences of identity-based inequalities are often associated with weak identification 
with the nation-state. Yet minority groups in Botswana continue to express identification with 
the nation-state; they are overwhelmingly proud to be Motswana. The question remains as to 
whether such a commitment to the nation-state can create conditions for recognition and the 
disruption of existing identity-based inequalities to enable full participation in society by all. On 
this question, our process-tracing analysis of Botswana’s experiences negotiating national unity 
and ethnic diversity has implications for other multiethnic nation-states and for the future of 
Botswana itself. 
Our analysis points to three mechanisms by which Botswana may have cultivated 
national unity despite limited redress of identity-based inequalities, with important caveats on the 
need for further research. First, redistribution of educational resources has been high, palpably 
felt by most Motswana and perceived as a share in the wealth of the nation-state. Second, and 
related, high rates of access to education across ethnic groups mean that most Motswana have 
frequent contact with government institutions and the social citizenship they provide. Globally, 
communities often create alternative education in response to culturally and linguistically 
assimilationist practices. These separate structures often entrench conflict, such as in Northern 
Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; IIEP 2011). More 
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research is needed to understand why minorities in Botswana have not created such structures 
and the implications for national unity and recognition.  
Third, responses to identity-based inequalities in Botswana have been markedly different 
from other contexts, such as South Africa, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, where tensions 
over cultural content of curriculum and language of instruction have been cause for violent 
conflict and sometimes catalysts of civil war. Our analysis points to the possible impact of swift 
and tangible redistribution of resources and attention – albeit incomplete – to issues of 
recognition as mechanisms to mitigate marginalization. Importantly, these actions appear 
connected to the transformation of inequalities, or at minimum the perceptions of inequalities, 
from horizontal ones based on ethnicity to vertical ones. Our analysis has further uncovered 
markedly different responses to existing and continued identity-based inequalities in the form of 
political pressure and ongoing dialogue rather than violent conflict. Some scholars credit the 
kgotla, communal decision-making bodies in Botswana where conflict resolution occurs through 
discussion (Gulbrandsen 2012); while kgotla are originally Tswana institutions, ethnic minorities 
have participated in them, in varying capacities, since pre-colonial times. Further research is 
needed into more contemporary participation in kgotla and other bases for observed peaceful 
methods of dissent, including related to the possible role of education, in its content and 
pedagogy. Moreover, further research is needed to better understand the perceptions of both 
historical and contemporary identity-based inequalities and their relationships to current feelings 
of unity and/or resistance, held by majority and minority ethnic group members.   
Unlike in neighboring countries whose trajectories Botswana worked so explicitly to 
avoid, violent conflict has not erupted. National unity, premised on monocultural and 
monolingual identity but accompanied by redistribution of resources, may have played an 
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important role in cultivating this stability, including in promoting peaceful dissent. The process 
of developing national unity may have broken down barriers to cooperation (Nyati-Saleshando 
2011), specifically enabling the vast majority of citizens to feel Motswana and to be able to talk 
to each other through a shared language. Overwhelmingly, citizens do not want to give up being 
Motswana or speaking Setswana. Many do, however, wish for greater recognition of their 
ethnicity and, as we have demonstrated, serious tensions exist as a result. 
Ongoing lack of recognition and persistent identity-based inequalities may now pose a 
threat to continued stability. Political and educational theorists are increasingly in agreement that 
unity and recognition are not mutually exclusive and that, in fact, in multiethnic societies, unity 
may not be fully possible without recognition (Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Banks 2008). Yet 
the balance between unity and recognition is importantly embedded in context. The threat of 
conflict in post-independence Botswana lent gravity to unity, even for those whom that unity 
could harm through lack of recognition. The current context, however, has shifted, and the 
threats are different. As our analysis has shown, there are high levels of unity in Botswana. In 
this context, ethnic diversity is no longer the critical threat to be managed by the state; the 
contemporary threat is limited recognition of ethnicity and language, perpetuating identity-based 
inequalities and lack of full participation. Peace is not a fixed characteristic, and the ultimate test 
will be the adaptability of the nation-state to address these current threats. 
 
 
 
Notes 
                                                
1 In 1999, the historically non-Tswana districts of Ghanzi, North East, Kgalagadi, and North West/Ngamiland were 
not included in the sample. 
2 The question was asked as follows: 2005 and 2008: “What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural group” 
and 2012: “Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?” Response 
was open and recorded exactly as stated by the respondent.  
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3 We examined results that included nine ethnic groups first as part of the majority group and then as part of the 
minority group (Mohurutshe, Mokhurutshe, Mmirwa, Mongologa, Motswapong, Motlharo, Motlhaping, Mokgothu, 
and Motalaote). These ethnic groups speak languages that are mutually intelligible with Setswana. We ultimately 
decided to include them in the minority group following Boikhutso and Jotia (2013); given the existence of language 
advocacy organizations for some of these groups (e.g., Lentswe la Batswapong); and based on our own field-based 
work in which members of these ethnic groups described stigma they faced in language use and experiences in 
school similar to those of other ethnic minority groups. The number of respondents in these nine additional ethnic 
groups combined was small (14.2% of the sample in 2005, 15% in 2008, and 11.7% in 2012), and the analyses show 
no substantial differences whether they are categorized as majority or minority. 
4 The question is phrased as follows: “We have spoken to many People in Botswana and they have all described 
themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, religion, race, and others 
describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being a citizen of 
Botswana which specific group to do you feel you belong to first and foremost?” 
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Table 1. Interview Participants5 
 
Interview No. Type of Organization 
1 Language Rights NGO 
2 Human Rights NGO 
3 Language Rights NGO 
4 Ministry of Education, Central Office 
5 Language Rights NGO 
6 University 
7 Vision 2016 Task Group 
8 Ministry of Education, Central Office 
9 Ministry of Education, District Education Office 
10 Ministry of Education, Central Office 
11 Textbook Author 
12 University 
13 University 
 
  
                                                
5 Many of the interview participants have more than one role and sphere of work. To preserve anonymity, we 
include here the most salient role from which they shared perspectives for this research.  
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 Figure 1. Negotiating national unity and ethnic diversity: Key moments in Botswana’s post-independence education 
 
